- Areas of expertise: Thesis Title: An application of the quad-model: Director’s social network and Board’s monitoring performance Research Interests: Strategic Management, Corporate Governance, Board of Directors
- Available to work from: 1st January 2020
- Email address: firstname.lastname@example.org
MSc Finance (Economics & Finance) University of Durham, England
BSc Economics (Quantitative Economics) Universität Konstanz, Germany
Best Pitch, 10th International Accounting & Finance Doctoral Symposium, June 2017
11th International Accounting & Finance Doctoral Symposium, Bangor, June 2018
10th International Accounting & Finance Doctoral Symposium, Warsaw, June 2017
'Are Quad-Qualified Directors Effective Board Monitors?'
In the last two decades, corporate scandals and financial crises have led researchers, practitioners and regulators to focus on the role of the board of directors and how to ensure effective monitoring of company’s top management. An extensive body of research examines how certain characteristics among directors help to improve board’s monitoring. Such characteristics, which comprise director attributes such as independence, expertise, busyness, and motivation, are mostly investigated in isolation and not as a unified group.
Recently, a board’s monitoring effectiveness is seen as a function of ability and motivation. While directors should be independent, a director’s experience as well as availability to pursue her tasks accounts for her overall ability. However, a director’s ability can only fully come into effect if the director is, at the same time, sufficiently motivated to engage in these tasks. Accordingly, Hambrick, Misangyi and Park (2015, AMR) combine the four board attributes of independence, expertise, busyness and motivation into one theoretical model and suggests future research should test its applicability.
My thesis builds on Hambrick et. al. (2015) and the quad model. Based on a comprehensive sample of director characteristics, employment records, and social network data, the aim is to consolidate previous findings in order to develop an empirical model to test the impact of quad-qualified directors on the ability of boards to execute their monitoring function.
Strategic Management, Corporate Governance, Director Qualification
“Are Quad-Qualified Directors Efficient Board Monitors? An Analysis of CEO Turnover” (working paper)
Referee 1 Name: Dr Iain Clacher
Referee 2 Name: Gianluca Veronesi